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Should	India	amend	its	nuclear	doctrine?
Against	the	backdrop	of	a	muscular	posturing	of	Modi’s	foreign	policy	towards	Pakistan,	there	have
been	clamours	from	various	quarters	for	India	to	abandon	its	no-first-use	nuclear	policy	and	project	a
more	aggressive	nuclear	stance	to	match	Mr.	Modi’s	vision	of	foreign	policy.	Suyash	Saxena	writes.	
Against	the	backdrop	of	a	muscular	posturing	of	Modi’s	foreign	policy	towards	Pakistan,	there	have
been	clamours	from	various	quarters	for	India	to	abandon	its	no-first-use	nuclear	policy	and	project	a
more	aggressive	nuclear	stance	to	match	Mr.	Modi’s	vision	of	foreign	policy.	Last	year,	the	former	Indian	Defence
Minister,	Manohar	Parrikar,	had	caused	a	flutter	when	he	questioned	India’s	no-first-use	nuclear	stance.
Mr.	Parrikar	had	argued	that	abandoning	the	no	first	use	clause	of	the	doctrine	will	add	to	the	strength	and	deterrent
effect	of	our	nuclear	weapon	programme	(The	Indian	Express:	2016).	A	declared	policy	that	forecloses	the	possibility
of	a	first-strike	shrinks	the	menu	of	nuclear	options	available	to	New	Delhi	and	diminishes	India’s	nuclear	strength,	he
maintained.
His	view	garnered	support	from	various	quarters	especially	in	view	that	Pakistan	has	retained	its	first-strike	capability
ever	since	it	went	nuclear	in	1998	and	has	continually	hinted	implicit	nuclear	threats	to	arm-twist	India.
The	fact	that	Pakistan	deployed	its	nuclear	weapons	for	‘tactical’	use	after	the	Mumbai	terrorist	attacks	in	2008,	as	a
part	of	its	overt	policy	to	ensure	“full	spectrum	of	nuclear	deterrence”	has	further	antagonised	opinions	in	New	Delhi.
Former	National	Security	Adviser,	Mr	Shivshankar	Menon,	explains	in	his	new	book	Choices:	Inside	the	Making	of
India’s	Foreign	Policy	“What	this	means	is	that	Pakistan	will	build	many	more	nuclear	warheads	and	that	the	use	of
these	so-called	tactical	weapons	will	be	deployed	to	lower-ranking	officers	at	the	battlefield	level.	Once	that	happens,
command	and	control	of	these	lethal	weapons	will	be	much	looser.”	(Menon:	2016,	p.	173)
India’s	suspicions	and	apprehensions	gain	further	credence	from	the	fact	that	Pakistan	is	the	only	nuclear	weapon
state	in	the	world	whose	nuclear	weapon	programme	is	not	under	the	civilian	government’s	control	but	under	the
control	of	its	army	which	is	increasingly	radicalised.	Shivshankar	Menon	has	described	the	Pakistani	army	as
‘religiously	motivated’,	‘less	professional’	and	‘which	has	produced	rogue	officers	and	staged	coups	against	its	own
leaders’	(Menon	2016,	pp.	173).	Given	such	situation,	clearly,	India’s	security	concerns	are	intense.
Pakistan	is	one	of	the	biggest	external	nuclear	threats	to	India.	However,	India’s	nuclear	fears	are	not	limited	to	just
Pakistan.	Apprehensions	about	Beijing	and	growing	nuclear	presence	in	the	Indian	Ocean	are	also	causes	of	worry.
It	must	be	remembered	that	China	went	critical	in	1964,	when	the	wounds	of	Sino-Indian	war	were	still	raw	and	India
clearly	felt	threatened,	though	China	pledged	no	first	use.
Thus,	India	faces	genuine	security	concerns,	especially	from	Islamabad.	However,	the	moot	question	is:	does	such	a
regional	scenario	compel	India	to	amend	its	nuclear	doctrine?	Should	India	follow	the	suit	of	the	US	and	Pakistan,
and	adopt	a	first-use	policy?	Would	such	a	policy	help	ward	off	Indian	security	concerns?
Foreign	policy	or	the	nuclear	policy	of	any	nation	is	not	a	static	document	and	must	evolve	according	to	the	changing
times	and	geopolitical	dynamics.	However,	at	the	present	juncture	there	are	several	reasons	to	believe	that	it	shall
not	be	prudent	for	India	to	abandon	the	no-first-use	nuclear	doctrine.
Firstly,	the	credibility	of	India’s	nuclear	deterrence	programme	will	not	be	augmented	but	diminished	if	the	no	first	use
clause	is	removed.	No	first	use	clause	brings	great	clarity	into	India’s	nuclear	policy	as	it	defines	the	threshold	mark
which	if	breached	would	warrant	massive	nuclear	retaliation.	This	clarity	of	nuclear	threshold	is	essential	to	deter	the
possible	aggressors.	Abandoning	the	no	first	use	clause	would	mean	abandoning	this	clarity	of	the	nuclear	policy
and	thus	compromising	the	aim	of	achieving	“credible	minimum	deterrence”.
“The	clearer	and	simpler	the	task	of	our	nuclear	weapons,	the	more	credible	they	are.	And	the	more	credible	they
are,	the	stronger	will	be	their	deterrent	effect”	says,	Shivshankar	Menon	on	the	subject.	(Menon	2016)
Further,	the	declared	no	first	use	policy	almost	rules	out	the	possibility	of	pre-emptive	nuclear	strikes.	If	there	is	no
such	declared	no-first-use	policy	then,	under	certain	situations	the	likely	aggressor	may	even	feel	incentivised	to
launch	pre-emptive	strikes	and	take	early	advantage	in	a	possible	nuclear	exchange.
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From	a	larger	South	Asian	perspective,	abandoning	the	no	first	use	doctrine	will	greatly	destabilise	the	subcontinent
because	it	would	create	a	situation	where	two	acrimonious	neighbours	with	a	history	riddled	with	skirmishes	and
wars	will	both	possess	first	strike	capability.	Mutual	suspicions	will	increase	and	antagonisms	would	be	magnified.
The	restraint	on	the	nuclear	trigger	will	become	looser	and	the	subcontinent,	overall,	will	be	brought	closer	to	a
nuclear	war.	Even	a	knee-jerk,	emotive	response	to	an	event	may	instigate	a	full-blown	nuclear	war.
Even	further,	no-first-use	nuclear	policy	implicitly	imposes	an	upper	limit	to	the	nuclear	stockpile.	The	nuclear
stockpile	remains	restricted	to	a	level	at	which	it	is	able	to	ensure	credible	minimum	deterrence.	If	nuclear	policy
allows	first-strike	capability	and	the	use	of	nuclear	warheads	as	war-fighting	weapons,	then	it	incentivises	the	nation
to	escalate	its	nuclear	weapon	production.	The	greater	the	number	of	nuclear	arsenals	in	such	a	nation’s	quiver,	the
greater	its	military	clout.	This	may	potentially	set	of	an	arms	race	in	the	region,	destabilising	it	in	the	long	run.
Kudankulam	Nuclear	Power	Plant	(KKNPP)	Units	1	and	2	in	Kudankulam,	Tamil	Nadu.
Image	credit:	Reetesh	Chaurasia	CC	BY-SA	4.0.
The	world	sees	India	as	a	responsible	and	mature	nuclear	power	which	exercises	self-restraint	despite	being	a	non-
signatory	to	non-proliferation	regimes	like	the	Nuclear	Non-Proliferation	Treaty	(NPT)	and	Comprehensive	Test	Ban
Treaty	(CTBT).	On	this	basis,	India	makes	its	claims	to	the	membership	of	international	platforms	like	Nuclear
Suppliers	Group	(NSG)	or	permanent	membership	of	UN	Security	Council	(UNSC)	without	being	compelled	to	sign
the	NPT.	Doing	away	with	the	no-first-use	clause	of	its	nuclear	policy	will	compromise	India’s	position	in	all	such
issues	and	jeopardise	its	civilian	nuclear	partnerships	with	countries	like	Japan	and	the	US.
India	cannot	follow	the	suit	of	countries	like	Pakistan	which	have	traditionally	been	aggressors.	Since	the	beginning
of	India’s	independent	foreign	policy	during	the	Nehruvian	period,	India	has	maintained	a	moral	high	ground	in	its
international	relations.	India’s	foreign	policy	has	been	driven	by	ethics	and	morality	as	much	as	it	has	been	driven	by
realism	and	pragmatism.	That	is	why	India	is	the	only	nuclear	weapon	state	in	the	world	that	has	been	a	full-throated
supporter	of	complete	nuclear	disarmament.	Thus,	among	other	things,	there	is	also	a	moral	compulsion	towards
India’s	ideals	of	peaceful	co-existence	and	Panchasheel	to	not	abandon	the	no-first-use	policy.
The	Indian	government	has	repeatedly	reviewed	its	no	first	use	nuclear	policy	since	India	attained	criticality	in	1998.
Each	time	the	government	has	upheld	it.	The	doctrine	has	been	quite	successful	in	achieving	its	objective	of	credible
minimum	deterrence.	Threats	and	attacks	by	aggressor	states	like	Pakistan	have	significantly	diminished.	In	fact,	it
may	be	observed	that	no	full-fledged	war	has	happened	since	Pokhran-I,	1974	while	three	full-fledged	wars	were
fought	between	the	two	countries	within	twenty-five	years	of	independence	–	1947,	1965	and	1971.	Kargil	was	an
attempt	by	Pakistan	to	test	the	new	threshold	mark	after	India	went	nuclear	in	1998.
There	is	no	gainsaying	the	fact	that	India	must	keep	reviewing	its	nuclear	policy	and	keep	adapting	it	to	the
dynamism	of	international	politics.	However,	in	view	of	the	seven	reasons	discussed	above,	it	can	be	concluded	that
the	present	world	order	and	the	regional	situation	does	not	require	us	to	amend	our	no	first	use	nuclear	doctrine.
Abandoning	the	no	first	use	clause	cause	greater	harm	than	good	under	the	present	set	of	circumstances.
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This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	posting.
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